8 research outputs found

    Measuring Stakeholder Agreement and Stability in a Decentralised Organisation

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    A decentralised organisation (DO) is a multi-stakeholder institution where decision making is assigned to various levels of the organisation. Decentralised stakeholders play an important role in the governance of a decentralised organisation. The ability to measure DO stability will help monitor the health of the organisation and acts as an early warning system for disagreement and group exit, leading to its destabilisation/collapse. For example, blockchain hard forks. We propose the organisational tension quadrilateral to study agreement between stakeholders and build a tool based on voting data (information as vote choices) to measure its stability. The stakeholders are permitted to vote their choice into an electronic ballot box. Here, each vote choice represents a measure of agreement. When voting ends, this information is aggregated and used to build a metric for DO stability. To the best of our knowledge, there are no similar tools available to measure DO stability

    Always on Voting: A Framework for Repetitive Voting on the Blockchain

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    Elections repeat commonly after a fixed time interval, ranging from months to years. This results in limitations on governance since elected candidates or policies are difficult to remove before the next elections, if needed, and allowed by the corresponding law. Participants may decide (through a public deliberation) to change their choices but have no opportunity to vote for these choices before the next elections. Another issue is the peak-end effect, where the judgment of voters is based on how they felt a short time before the elections. To address these issues, we propose Always on Voting (AoV) -- a repetitive voting framework that allows participants to vote and change elected candidates or policies without waiting for the next elections. Participants are permitted to privately change their vote at any point in time, while the effect of their change is manifested at the end of each epoch, whose duration is shorter than the time between two main elections. To thwart the problem of peak-end effect in epochs, the ends of epochs are randomized and made unpredictable, while preserved within soft bounds. These goals are achieved using the synergy between a Bitcoin puzzle oracle, verifiable delay function, and smart contracts

    BBB-Voting: 1-out-of-k Blockchain-Based Boardroom Voting

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    Voting is a means to agree on a collective decision based on available choices (e.g., candidates), where participants (voters) agree to abide by their outcome. To improve some features of e-voting, decentralized solutions based on a blockchain can be employed, where the blockchain represents a public bulletin board that in contrast to a centralized bulletin board provides 100%100\% availability and censorship resistance. A blockchain ensures that all entities in the voting system have the same view of the actions made by others due to its immutable and append-only log. The existing blockchain-based boardroom voting solution called Open Voting Network (OVN) provides the privacy of votes and perfect ballot secrecy, but it supports only two candidates. We present BBB-Voting, an equivalent blockchain-based approach for decentralized voting than OVN, but in contrast to it, BBB-Voting supports 1-out-of-kk choices and provides a fault tolerance mechanism that enables recovery from stalling participants. We provide a cost-optimized implementation using Ethereum, which we compare with OVN and show that our work decreases the costs for voters by 13.5%13.5\% in terms of gas consumption. Next, we outline the extension of our implementation scaling to magnitudes higher number of participants than in a boardroom voting, while preserving the costs paid by the authority and participants -- we made proof-of-concept experiments with up to 1000 participants

    ILP Formulations for Optimal Task Scheduling with Communication Delays on Parallel Systems

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